General Manoj Mukund Naravane, former Army Chief recently stated in a media interview that India required more China “experts”. The context in which he gave these remarks were over the controversy on his unpublished memoirs in which he writes extensively on events leading upto the standoff with China in 2020 in Galwan. Gen. Naravane stated that China was a long-term challenge and thus, India needed more experts to understand Beijing’s motives. He added that this was only reason India was “surprised’ in Eastern Ladakh in 2020. Two things stand out here. First, there are a number of think tanks which have experts on China. Second, the government has several agencies capable of gathering intelligence and educating the government and the military on Chinese intentions towards India. While Techint against China is fairly good, humint remains an weak area. Understanding China’s motives and intentions requires “experts” of different hues. This analysis seeks to breakdown and list the kind of experts India needs. While existing capabilities are good, refinement of capabilities using Artificial Intelligence will help enhance our systems.
More assessment expertise needed
When the developments in Eastern Ladakh occurred in 2020, India was aware that the Chinese PLA was undertaking large-scale exercises in Tibet. Over 60,000 troops were involved. That the PLA shifted its focus from exercises to operations in Eastern Ladakh within a short span of time is probably what caught India by surprise. However, the deeper problem as the former Army Chief indicated was Indian inability to look deep inside China. Two issues arise. First, the ability of intelligence analysts to analyse all available intelligence at various levels. For instance, when satellites picked up the movement of Chinese PLA forces on exercise in 2020, the assessment would have naturally been of regular exercises. If India possessed layered imagery capability that could have brought together imagery from along the LAC to positions in depth, upto 200 kms, then some logistic conclusions could have been drawn. That is one part of the narrative.
Motives vs Intentions
The other common conclusion drawn by analysts is that a rogue PLA commander decided to convert training exercises into an operation for self-glory. This misses the point that in the Chinese system, it near impossible for a regional or theatre commander to act on his own, without the approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC). In all probability, Galwan was authorised by President Xi Jinping. This is where the question of motives arise. Again, a caveat is required. Motives are different from intentions. Understanding intentions is a question of being able to assess in advance what the adversary is planning to do. Motives are tied to China’s objective of carrying out a particular operation, let us say Galwan in 2020. To understand intentions, India needed satellite imagery, as mentioned above, in layers, and an assessment capability that combines technical knowledge with a past data base that records similar Chinese movements. Specifically, the NTRO should have been able to go beyond merely providing imagery to the government and analyse the movements based on prior data knowledge. The use of AI will help this process. R&AW has the assessment capability, but this too is unable to go beyond the standard assessments, based on past records.
Military Intelligence has analysts, both at Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre and in Military Intelligence and the Defence Intelligence Agency to analyse technical intelligence on China, but this has to be on a day-to-day basis, especially when a crisis is afoot. What usually gets into the public domain, is a record of military movements on the Chinese side (usually after the event has occurred) to demonstrate the availability of intelligence, mostly imagery. The historical facts are clear. Since the early 2000s, China has been pushing westwards in eastern Ladakh with the objective of preventing Indian patrols from reaching their last point of patrolling. This then gives the PLA the opportunity to grab more territory, without encountering Indian patrols. This incidentally, was the Chinese strategy prior to the 1962 border war with India. One little noticed, but significant instance occurred in Samar Lungpa in northern Ladakh in 2012. The Chinese wanted to build a bridge across the Chip Chap river. India objected because this location is only 30 km from the Karakoram Pass. The 2012-2014 incursions were part of the series of incursions that the PLA carried out to ensure that India was always on the alert in northern and eastern Ladakh, while slowly nibbling away at territory. The motive for this action was to give depth to its G-219 motor highway which passes through Indian claimed territory and is illegally occupied by China.
As long as perceptions on where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) stands vary between India and China, a resolution to the border issue will not occur. Till then, China will continue to doctrinally and operationally stick to the principles laid down by the Central Military Commision to push their limits all along the LAC. Therefore, India’s intelligence and academia will have to develop three skills. First, enhance Chinese language proficiency to regularly translate and analyse Chinese media and official literature. Of course, big data would be of great help here. Second, intelligence agencies need many more analysts familiar with Chinese culture, idioms, strategy and thinking to be able to make regular assessments that will give us a deeper picture of political turmoil within the CPC. At the same time, the Indian military will need in depth satellite coverage, ranging from the LAC to at least 200 km in depth coverage. One can say this is work in progress, but while imagery is available in plenty, the missing part is assessment.
For instance, how does one assess when a training exercise shifts into the operational mode? This is usually borne out by equipment carried by the adversarial forces. And also, whether the PLA forces are fully armed and ready for battle. This will require not only Techint but also Humint. How does one obtain Humint from within China and Tibet? The answer lies in using the expertise of other countries like Taiwan. From an Indian perspective, the greatest asset we have are the Special Forces of the Indian Army who are skilled at this game of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. However, the biggest takeaway for the intelligence would be to utilise big data to collect and collate data from within China. Just like Project Echelon launched by the US and part of the Five Eyes Network that monitors global signal intelligence for threats, India needs its own project to monitor China. AI and big data will provide the means to look at China in depth and detail, something that is missing currently. This is the need of the hour and getting the systems for this should become a national security priority.
